Introduction
In this study, we examine the effect of financial constraints, measured at both the macroeconomic-level and the firm-level, on corporate tax avoidance behavior. While understanding the tax effects of financial constraints at the firm-level is important as researchers attempt to explain tax avoidance behavior (see Shackelford and Shevlin 2001 and Hanlon and Heitzman 2010 for a comprehensive review), understanding the tax effects of macroeconomic financial constraints is potentially more important because these constraints impact all firms in the economy simultaneously. If firms simultaneously increase tax avoidance when faced with macroeconomic financial constraints, this behavior has the potential to magnify the effect of an economic contraction on government revenues. Government revenues are likely to decrease due to both a reduction in the tax base (i.e., lower taxable incomes due to the contraction) and, to a lesser extent, an increase in corporate tax avoidance activities. As the federal deficit becomes a key factor in the future financial health of the country, it is important to understand the interplay between macroeconomic forces and firm-level tax avoidance behavior as legislators look for ways to reduce the federal deficit.
We define tax avoidance broadly as all actions taken by managers to reduce their cash income tax liability and measure avoidance using current-year worldwide cash effective tax rates (cash ETR). Our proxies for macroeconomic financial constraints (change in gross domestic product and change in lending standards) capture an increased cost of and/or increased difficulty in accessing external funds. Our proxies for firm-level financial constraints (the decile rank of the Whited-Wu financial constraint index and Altman's Z score) capture investment-related constraints (i.e., firms constraints resulting from an inability to fund all profitable investment opportunities) and distress-related constraints (i.e., constraints resulting from a need to cover short-term working cash flow obligations) respectively.
In these settings, tax planning can be viewed as an alternative source of financing.
Because traditional financing sources (i.e., debt or equity) often become more costly or more difficult to acquire during periods of financial constraints, firms look to alternative sources of funds. Funds can be "acquired" through tax planning by reducing current reported taxable income or increasing tax credits, thereby decreasing the cash taxes paid. The cost of these funds is a function of amount of cash taxes saved, the timing of eventual repayment (if at all), and any interest and payments eventually paid to the tax authority as a result of the planning activities.
We anticipate constrained firms will engage in tax planning as a source of funds for several reasons. First, unlike many other cost-cutting techniques (e.g., reducing research and development, advertising, capital expenditures, staffing, etc.), reducing cash taxes is less likely to adversely impact firm operations. Second, recent research provides evidence that managers primarily focus on tax strategies that produce both a cash and financial reporting benefit (i.e., tax strategies that produce permanent book tax differences) with only a secondary interest in strategies that only produce a cash benefit (i.e., deferral strategies that produce temporary book tax differences) (Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker 2012; Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff 2012) . These studies suggest firms likely have not exhausted opportunities to generate cash via deferral planning strategies. Third, anecdotal evidence suggests constrained firms are more likely to use tax planning as a source of cash. Specifically, practitioners indicate that, during tough economic times, "cash is king, and a lot of companies are receptive to focusing on opportunities in the tax area that they may not have been eager to focus on in the past" (Leone 2008 ).
To test our prediction, we first investigate the association between cash tax avoidance and various macroeconomic and firm-level financial constraints. Consistent with our predictions, firms facing financial constraints arising from either macroeconomic conditions or firm-specific financial constraints exhibit lower cash ETRs. Moreover, the reduction in cash ETRs is economically significant. Our results indicate that, on average, firms' one year-ahead cash ETRs are approximately 1.5% lower following periods of macroeconomic financial constraint relative to periods with no macroeconomic constraint and approximately 2% lower for firms facing higher firm-level financial constraints.
In our analyses discussed above, we exclude loss firms to be consistent with prior research examining tax planning. Because loss firms are likely an important subset of financially constrained firms, we conduct supplemental analysis including firms with a loss in the current year but cumulative profits over the available loss carryback period (i.e., five years for observations with year ends from 2008 through 2010 and two years for all other observations).
These firms have an incentive to increase their taxable loss to maximize their current refund.
Results from these tests are consistent with our expectations and suggest that financiallyconstrained firms with pretax profits or losses increase tax avoidance to generate additional cash
The findings of this study are important for several reasons. First, a reduction in taxes paid during times of financial constraint could have significant consequences on the overall economy. Specifically, if firms simultaneously increase their tax planning activities when faced with financial constraints induced by macroeconomic conditions, this behavior has the potential to magnify the effect of an economic contraction on government revenues. Government revenues would decrease as a result of both the decrease in the corporate tax base caused directly by the contraction and an increase in tax avoidance behavior.
The impact of the financial crisis of the late 2000s is consistent with the conjecture presented above. In the United States, the federal deficit increased during the crisis to unprecedented levels. Our analysis suggests an average decline of approximately 3% in cash ETRs due to tax avoidance activities during the macroeconomic contraction that occurred during
2009. This estimated ETR effect equates to approximately a $23 billion decline in corporate tax revenues and represents approximately 13% of the $182 billion total income taxes after credits from all profitable C-corporations for 2009.
Second, this study contributes to the literature examining the effects of financial constraints. Research examining the consequences of financial constraints has become of increased interest in recent years as firms across the globe have experienced a significant credit crisis. Examining firms' responses through the tax account to financial constraints is advantageous relative to examining responses to financial constraints through other behaviors because financial accounting rules for income taxes require a relatively comprehensive set of disclosures. In addition to the total accrued tax expense, firms must identify the portion of the current fiscal period's tax provision that is being deferred into subsequent periods as well as the amount of total cash taxes paid during the period. Thus, we can measure with a higher degree of precision how financial constraints affect cash taxes paid by firms.
Finally, we contribute to the growing literature on the determinants of firms' tax avoidance behavior and the relative importance of avoiding cash payments of taxes versus reducing financial accounting tax expense. We consider whether increased financial constraints trigger an increase in tax avoidance behavior. It is of particular interest that this increase in financial constraints can be firm-specific or economy-wide. This study is one of the first to investigate whether macroeconomic forces affect firm-level tax avoidance behavior. This study also sheds light on the debate related to the relative importance of tax planning activities generating cash flow savings versus financial reporting benefits. Recent studies provide evidence suggesting that managers focus primarily on tax planning strategies that reduce total tax expense (which increases both net cash flows and reported earnings) with only a secondary interest in tax planning strategies that produce a cash flow benefit but no financial statement benefit (Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker 2012; Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff 2012) . Our study provides evidence of specific conditions that increase managers' focus on cash tax savings.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops our hypotheses relating financial constraints to tax avoidance. Section 3 details the sample, Section 4 describes the research design, Section 5 presents univariate statistics, Section 6 presents our findings and discusses the economic significance, and Section 7 concludes.
Hypothesis Development
In this study, we define both tax avoidance and financial constraint broadly. We define tax avoidance as all actions taken by managers to reduce their total cash income tax liability. Tax avoidance can include both legal planning strategies in full compliance with tax laws and more aggressive strategies resulting from aggressive interpretations of ambiguous areas within the tax laws. Our measures are discussed in greater detail in Section 4 and capture worldwide tax avoidance. Our aim is not to specifically measure tax aggressiveness, tax risk, tax evasion, or tax sheltering. Instead, we employ a broad measure that captures a firm's propensity to reduce its cash tax burden relative to its reported financial accounting pretax income. This definition is consistent with prior research and stems primarily from Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008) .
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We take a broad view of financial constraint and define a firm as more financially constrained if it experiences an increase in the cost of external financing or an increase in the difficulty of accessing external funds (Whited and Wu 2006; Denis and Sibilkov 2010) . The financing need and the resulting constraint can arise from a variety of sources. We focus on two major sources of the financing need: investment opportunities and financial distress. Firms with unfunded investment opportunities require additional cash in order to finance those additional investments. Firms in financial distress require additional cash in order to finance existing operations and remain solvent. For both of these sources of the financing need, the financially constrained firm needs additional financing through the least costly source available. Constrained firms have an increased incentive to reduce cash taxes regardless of whether the source of the constraint is a macroeconomic shock or a firm-specific event such as the loss of a major customer. As a result, we exam both macroeconomic and firm-specific financial constraints.
Examining financially constraints from a macroeconomic perspective has the added advantage in that macroeconomic constraints are generally exogenous to the firm. The exogenous nature of the macroeconomic shock allows for better identification in our empirical analysis. We predict that an increase in financial constraints decreases the supply and/or increases the cost of external funds which incentivizes a firm to generate additional cash funds internally.
Tax Planning and Financial Constraints
Corporate income taxes are a non-discretionary expenditure imposed by the government that all profitable firms must incur. Although income taxes are imposed on all firms at specified statutory rates, a manager can implement various strategies to reduce the firm's tax liability. A growing stream of literature examines the determinants of a firm's tax avoidance behavior (for a constraints. These near-term tax responses may or may not be reflected in long-run measures, which likely blend tax avoidance during both constrained and unconstrained periods.
review of the literature see Shackelford and Shevlin 2001 and Heitzman 2010) . In this study, we examine the impact of financial constraints, arising at both the macroeconomic level and the firm level, on a firm's tax avoidance behavior. We predict that financially constrained firms will take actions to increase internally-generated funds via cash tax planning.
We focus on cash tax planning as a source of internal funds for the following reasons.
First, a financially constrained firm that attempts to generate additional internal funds could reduce cash outflows through a variety of options. Most cost-cutting options, such as reducing advertising, research and development, capital expenditures, or labor costs, often adversely impact the firm's long-term performance. Unlike these cost-cutting techniques, reducing a firm's cash tax burden is unlikely to have negative long-term consequences assuming the tax strategies are upheld upon audit. Second, recent research suggests that managers primarily focus on strategies that produce both a cash and financial reporting benefit (i.e., permanent tax strategies) with only a secondary interest in strategies that only produce a cash benefit (i.e., deferral strategies). For example, Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker (2012) find a strong negative association between tax director incentive compensation and GAAP effective tax rates, but no relation between incentive compensation and cash effective tax rates (i.e., cash tax savings). Furthermore, Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff (2012) survey corporate tax executives and report that 47 percent of the managers in their sample of publicly-traded firms indicate that their firm's GAAP effective tax rate is the most important tax metric to top management, whereas only 15 percent state that cash 3 Even if the strategies are not sustained upon audit, if the interest and penalties paid to the tax authority are less than the interest that would have been paid to a third party lender, the tax planning firm is better off. This discussion does not include costs associated with implementing tax planning strategies. Although these costs are not trivial, prior research estimates an average return of approximately $4 for every $1 invested in general tax planning (Mills, Erickson, and Maydew 1998 In sum, we predict that financially constrained firms will take actions to increase internally-generated funds via cash tax planning because (1) firms prefer reducing tax costs rather than cutting other operating costs, (2) (1) the amount of cash taxes saved, (2) the timing of eventual repayment (if at all) and (3) any interest and payments eventually paid to the tax authority as a result of the planning activities. In the case of a tax planning strategy that defers tax payments, the firm is effectively receiving an interest-free loan from the government for the duration of the deferral period. In the case of a tax planning strategy that permanently avoids tax payments, there are no principal or interest payments if the tax authority does not challenge the position and repayment of principle, interest, and penalties if the tax authority successfully challenges the position.
Obtaining financing in this manner, the firm knows (1) the amount borrowed, (2) the length of the borrowing period and (3) expected future payments. This enables the manager to estimate a marginal cost of capital for the tax savings and weight the relative merits of financing through tax planning versus other more traditional forms of financing such as debt or equity.
Prior to facing the financial constraint in question the firm has presumably already accessed the cheapest "tax financing." The marginal tax planning opportunities will have a higher cost, and so utilizing this source of funds will only make sense if the returns to the project will exceed the costs of the marginal tax plan and there is no cheaper source of financing.
Viewing tax planning as a source of financing, in conjunction with standard theories in finance (e.g., pecking order theory; Myers 1984) , supports the prediction that managers will rely more heavily on generating funds via tax planning when those funds represent the cheapest source of financing available to the firm. Financial constraints likely rearrange the rank ordering of this cost of capital; external funds (both debt and equity) can become more costly, thereby causing managers to reevaluate possible internal sources of funds. The fact that managers did not access all possible tax planning projects during non-constrained times is not necessarily indicative of inefficiencies. For example, deferral strategies, which are basically an interest-free loan from the government, might not be pursued vigorously because the benefits are not recognized for financial reporting purposes. For deferral strategies, the GAAP effective tax rate is unchanged as is reported net income. Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker (2012) provide evidence that tax directors are incentivized to reduce the level of tax expense reported in the financial statements. Also consistent with this notion, Edgerton (2012) shows that tax incentives for investment are more effective when the incentive impacts accounting income (e.g., investment tax credits) than when the incentives do not affect accounting income (e.g., bonus depreciation).
Sample
To investigate the effect of financial constraints on firms' tax planning activities, we begin with firms listed on Compustat from 1987, the first year following the most recent major tax reform, to 2011. Consistent with prior tax avoidance studies, we eliminate financial firms and utility firms, firm-year observations with missing or negative pretax income, and firm-year observations missing the necessary data to compute the tax planning, financial constraint and control variables used in our analyses. 6 Table 1 summarizes our sample selection process.
To investigate the effect of firm-level financial constraints on firms' tax planning activities, we utilize the same primary sample of 44,328 firm-years with the firm-level financial constraint measures (the decile rank of the Altman Z-score and the rank of the Whited and Wu investment financial constraint index).
To investigate the effect of macroeconomic financial constraints, we require additional data on GDP growth and economy-wide lending practices. To retain the largest sample possible, we impose each of these restrictions separately resulting in samples of 44,328 (37,290) firm-year observations when using GDP growth (tightening of lending standards) to proxy for macroeconomic constraints.
Research Design
To examine the relation between financial constraints and tax avoidance, we estimate the following regression:
Tax Avoidance
When testing the relation between tax avoidance and macroeconomic and firm-level 6 Despite eliminating firms with negative pretax income, we observe large variation in our firm-specific financial constraint measures. In supplemental analyses (see Section 6.3), we include loss firms that can likely benefit from additional tax avoidance in the current period (i.e., firms that can carry back current losses to obtain a refund of taxes paid in prior years) while continuing to exclude loss firms that are unlikely to benefit from additional tax avoidance in the current period (i.e., firms that must carry forward current losses to potentially offset future income).
financial constraints, Tax_Avoidance is set equal to a firm's cash effective tax rate (CashETR), measured as the ratio of cash taxes paid to pretax income adjusted for special items [Compustat data items txpd / (pi -spi)]. 7, 8 Cash taxes vary with firms profitability: more profitable firms are expected to pay higher taxes. Thus we scale cash taxes by pretax book income to reflect this relation, which is particularly important in our setting where we examine macroeconomic downturns which lead to declines in firm profitability. If a firm's CashETR is above one (below negative one), CashETR is set equal to one (negative one). 9 As discussed by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) in their review of the literature on tax research, it is important to select a tax avoidance measure appropriate to the research question and not simply apply a laundry list of measures. We utilize cash ETR because we are interested in how firms respond to financial constraints that result in a need to generate additional cash. A firm's cash ETR is the most direct measure of a firm's cash tax burden. Tax planning that decreases a firm's cash tax burden will have a direct impact on a firm's cash ETR. Unlike prior studies that use long-run ETR measures to avoid noise in the one-year measure (see Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2008) , we utilize a one-year cash ETR measure to capture timely responses to existing financial constraints. There are a number of potential strategies that firms can implement in a relatively short time period.
For example, firms can more aggressively expense instead of capitalize expenditures, shift income to lower tax jurisdictions, take advantage of programs such as the domestic manufacturing deduction, and engage in timing strategies which accelerate deductions and delay income recognition. 
Financial Constraints
The variable of interest in equation (1), Constraint, captures the level of either the macroeconomic or firm-specific financial constraints faced by the firm. As discussed in the hypothesis development section, we consider two possible drivers of the financial constraint:
investment opportunities and financial distress. Our measure, Constraint, equals the lagged value of one of two macroeconomic financial constraint measures (GDP% and Tightening) or the lagged value of one of two firm-level financial constraint measures (RankZ for distress related financial constraint and RankWW for investment related financial constraint). We use lagged values of financial constraints because tax avoidance strategies generally require time to plan and implement. We examine the sensitivity of our results to this assumption in Section 6.6.
Our first macroeconomic financial constraint measure, GDP%, is based on data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. GDP% equals negative one times the percentage change in inflation-adjusted GDP. We multiply the variable by negative one so that higher values of GDP% correspond to higher levels of macroeconomic financial constraint. Higher (lower) values of GDP% are associated with economic contractions (growth) during which external funding is often more limited (more abundant) and firms are more (less) likely to face financial constraints.
Our second macroeconomic financial constraint measure, Tightening, is based on data from the 10 Although CashETR is the best measure of a firm's cash tax liability, CashETR has several potential limitations. For example, there is a potential timing mismatch between the numerator and denominator (i.e., cash payments for taxes may not occur within the same fiscal period as the income to which they relate). The potential mismatch can result in payments or refunds from adjacent years being included in our year of interest, a concern that is heightened for constrained firms if these firms delay tax payments to future years. A more complete discussion of this concern and other potential limitations of CashETR is included in section 6.3. To alleviate these concerns, we use two additional accrual measures, the current ETR and the US Federal ETR, in supplemental analyses. Results are discussed in section 6.3 and are consistent with those using CashETR. Our first firm-specific measure, RankZ, is based on the firm's Altman (1968) bankruptcy prediction Z-score. Firms closer to bankruptcy face greater difficulty accessing external funds.
To reduce noise in this measure, we use the decile rank of the firm's Z-score in year t-1 where higher values indicate they are more likely to be financially distressed. 13 RankWW equals the decile ranking of a firm's investment related financial constraint index developed in Whited and Wu (2006) . RankWW is coded so that higher values represent higher financial constraints. 14 If financial constraints increase tax planning behavior, we anticipate negative coefficients on Constraint across our various specifications.
Controls
In addition to our explanatory variable of interest, Constraint, we include a battery of control variables in our regression model. Many tax deductions, exclusions, and tax credits are not perfectly correlated with economic activity of the firm but are instead fixed over a relevant range (Zimmerman 1983; Wilkie 1988) . For example, a firm can often increase or decrease production without purchasing additional property, plant and equipment such that the depreciation tax deduction is fixed and does not vary directly with the activity. We refer to this relation as the fixed tax shield effect. To address this "nonlinearity" we include both an intercept and pretax return on assets, PROA (pi/at), as an additional explanatory variable. We expect a positive coefficient on PROA because a decrease (increase) in PROA as a proxy for economic activity will decrease (increase) the cash ETR due to the fixed tax shield effect. Additionally we include industry fixed effects which allow the intercept to vary across industries and we identify the association between tax avoidance and financial constraints by within industry variation rather than across industry variation (since cross-industry variation, such as fixed asset intensity, might reflect differences in the fixed tax shield effects).
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We control for firm size by including Size, measured as the natural log of total assets
[ln(at)]. Large firms are widely viewed as more sophisticated and can structure complex taxreduction transactions with the help of the best tax advisors (Mills, Erickson, and Maydew 1998; Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod 2007) . If large firms conduct more successful tax planning, then Size will be negatively related to tax costs. On the other hand, large, mature firms would have fewer tax shields and hence higher ETRs as their capital investment slows. Because size can capture 15 We do not explicitly control for the various tax brackets in our main analysis. Although financially constrained firms likely have lower taxable income than non-constrained firms, U.S. federal corporate taxes rates are at or near 35% for all income above $75,000 (the rate varies between 34% and 39% between $75,000 and $18,333,333 and is 35% for taxable income above $18,333,333) resulting in a relatively flat tax rate. In untabulated robustness tests, we include indicator variables (together and separately) for pretax income below $75,000 and pretax income below $18,333,333. Results from these specifications are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in the paper. In a similar vein, it is unlikely our results are driven by overpayments or refunds that could result from large changes in taxable income that could accompany financial constraint. We assume that firms, particularly firms facing cash shortages during financial constraint, will adjust estimated payments in a timely matter and avoid overpayments in order to conserve cash in the near term.
many effects, we make no directional prediction.
An extensive literature establishes that corporate taxpayers respond to tax incentives to place income in lower taxed jurisdictions (see Klassen and Laplante 2012 for recent evidence).
Because segment disclosures no longer require foreign asset disclosures, we use the absolute value of the ratio of foreign pretax income to worldwide pretax income (pifo/pi) as a proxy for foreign operations (Foreign). Following Mills and Newberry (2004) , we set foreign pretax income equal to zero for firm years where it is missing.
To control for the existing capital structure of the firm, we include Leverage which equals the ratio of long-term debt to assets [(dltt+dlc)/at]. Prior literature argues that debt provides an important tax shield (Graham 1996) and provides evidence of a negative relation between leverage and marginal tax rates. However, interest deductions decrease income for both tax and financial reporting purposes making it unclear whether leverage would necessarily decrease effective tax rates. Further, additional debt would increase cash outflows in the form of interest payments by a greater amount than the tax savings the interest expense would generate. Newberry and Dhaliwal (2001) argue that multinationals can place debt in high-tax locations and thus reduce their effective tax rates. Firms can also structure off-balance-sheet financing to maximize interest deductions without decreasing book income (Mills and Newberry 2004) or can structure debt to use foreign tax credits (Newberry 1998) . Collectively, these studies suggest that debt is negatively associated with effective tax rates. Finally, both of our firm-specific measures of financial constraints have measures of leverage as inputs. The inclusion of leverage as a control variable in our model helps ensure that the relation between financial constraints and tax avoidance we document is incremental to the effect of leverage.
We include CapEx, the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets (capx/at), as a proxy for tax planning opportunity. Governments often use tax policy to spur economic investment, especially during economic downturns. Consistent with legislated tax shields, capital-intensive firms have lower tax burdens (Gupta and Newberry 1997) , higher book-tax differences (Mills and Newberry 2001; Wilson 2009; Lisowsky 2010) , and higher IRS deficiencies (Rice 1992; Mills 1998) . Furthermore, many tax shelters during the 1990s involved long-lived capital assets (McGill and Outslay 2004) . We expect that CapEx will be negatively related to cash ETRs. 16 We include R&D, the ratio of research and development expense to revenues (xrd/sale), to control for intellectual property. Intellectual property, such as patents and brand intangibles, increases opportunities to decrease taxes via income shifting. Additionally the R&D tax credit reduces cash ETRs. As such, we expect R&D to be negatively related to cash ETRs.
To control for aggressive financial reporting practices, we include DiscAccruals.
DiscAccruals equals performance-matched discretionary accruals as measured in Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) . If firms that exhibit more aggressive financial reporting practices are more tax aggressive as suggested by Frank, Lynch, and Rego (2009), then we would expect a negative association between DiscAccruals and tax rates.
We include an indicator variable (NOL) to control for the presence of net operating loss carryforwards (i.e., a non-zero value for tlcf). Consistent with Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin (2010), we expect that NOL firms have lower tax rates because they are less profitable and are able to utilize the loss carryforwards to reduce taxable income and thus cash taxes.
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We also include the book-to-market ratio, BM, to control for firm growth. Growth firms often have substantial tax deferral opportunities and also often rely heavily on stock-based 16 Results are robust to defining CapEx as the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total assets (ppent/at). 18 Also note that financially distressed firms are more likely to have NOL carryforwards. By including NOLs separately, we are examining the effect of the financial distress constraint incremental to the effects of NOLs.
compensation, both of which decrease CashETRs. Finally, because tax subsidies are often unique to particular industries, we include industry-fixed effects (Barth, Beaver, and Landsman 1998) . 
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Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Financial Constraints and Cash ETRs
Panel A of Table 4 presents the results from estimating equation (1) using CashETR as the dependent variable and macroeconomic measures of financial constraints. The negative and significant coefficients on GDP% and Tightening are consistent with H1. To assess the economic significance of a macroeconomic increase in financial constraints, we focus on each measure
separately. An increase of one standard deviation in GDP% is accompanied by a 1.43% decrease in a firm's CashETR (-0.8251*0.0173), which represents an average reduction of $3.67 million in cash taxes and an increase of 1.33% of operating cash flows for sample firms. 21 An increase of one standard deviation in Tightening is accompanied by a 1.44% decrease in a firm's CashETR (-0.0007*20.632), which represents an average reduction of $3.70 million in cash taxes and an increase of 1.34% of operating cash flows for our sample firms. These reductions in CashETR are economically significant, and are after controlling for the level of economic activity on cash taxes by scaling cash taxes by pretax book income and including pretax ROA as an additional explanatory variable.
Panel B of Table 4 presents the results from estimating equation (1) using CashETR as the dependent variable and firm-specific measures of financial constraints. The coefficients on 20 Insignificant or even negative correlations across measures of financial constraint are not uncommon. In fact, Whited and Wu (2006, p.545) report that their measure is negatively correlated (ρ = -0.019) with another common measure of financial constraint developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) . 21 Calculations related to the cash tax reductions and the ratio of cash savings to operating cash flows for the macroeconomic measures of financial constraint follow: GDP%: $3.67 million cash tax benefit = -1.43%*$256.71 (mean adjusted pretax income). 1.33% of operating cash flows = $3.67 million/$276.73 million (mean operating cash flows). Tightening: $3.70 million cash tax benefit = -1.44%*$256.71 (mean adjusted pretax income). 1.34% of operating cash flows = $3.70 million/$276.73 million (mean operating cash flows).
both RankZ and RankWW are negative and significant. These results are consistent with H1 and suggest that financially-constrained firms increase tax avoidance to generate additional cash. The magnitude of the effect is also economically significant. For the ranked measure of financial distress, RankZ, a one decile increase in the independent variable is associated with a decrease in CashETR of 1.82, which represents an average reduction of $4.67 million in cash taxes and an increase of 1.69% of operating cash flows for our sample firms. 22 For the measure of financial constraint from Whited and Wu (2006) , RankWW, a one decile increase in the independent variable is associated with a decrease in CashETR of 2.02%, which represents an average reduction of $5.19 million in cash taxes and an increase of 1.87% of operating cash flows for our sample firms. In the interests of brevity, we do not discuss in detail the results for the control variables: many exhibit significant coefficients in directions consistent with prior literature.
Loss Firms
We exclude loss firms in our main analysis to be consistent with prior research examining tax planning. Because loss firms are likely an important subset of financially constrained firms, we conduct supplemental analysis including firms with a loss in the current year but cumulative profits over the current and prior two years (prior five years for [2008] [2009] [2010] . In general, a firm is able to carry a current year loss back to the prior two years and receive a refund of taxes previously paid. 23 As such, these firms have an incentive to increase their taxable loss to 22 Calculations related to the cash tax reductions and the ratio of cash savings to operating cash flows for the firmlevel measures of financial constraint follow: RankZ: $4.67 million cash tax benefit = -1.82%*$256.71 (mean adjusted pretax income). 1.69% of operating cash flows = $4.67 million/$276.73 million (mean operating cash flows). RankWW: $5.19 million cash tax benefit = -2.02%*$256.71 (mean adjusted pretax income). 1.87% of operating cash flows = $5.19 million/$276.73 million (mean operating cash flows). 23 Firms with adjusted pretax book income less than zero must have cumulative pretax income over the prior two years to be included. We extend this window from two to five years for 2008 through 2010 to correspond with the legislated increase in the loss carryback period during that time. Firms with current losses that must be carried maximize their current refund. Consistent with this notion, prior research has documented intertemporal income shifting by firms to increase NOLs and cash refunds (Maydew 1997; Erickson, Heitzman, and Zhang 2012) . In this analysis, we re-estimate equation (1) after adding a loss indicator (Loss) set equal to one when adjusted pretax income is negative (pi-spi<0) and an interaction between Loss and Constraint. These additional variables allow us to examine the relation between financial constraints and tax planning for loss firms.
There are four possible combinations of cash taxes and pretax book income when including both profit and loss firms. We discuss profitable firms first. When a firm reports positive pretax book income and positive cash taxes paid (i.e., CashETR>0), we expect a negative coefficient on Constraint. This result would be consistent with our earlier hypotheses and indicate that these constrained firms take actions to reduce their positive tax liability. When a firm reports positive pretax book income and negative cash taxes (i.e., CashETR<0), we expect a negative coefficient on Constraint. This result would be consistent with our earlier hypotheses and indicate that these constrained firms take actions to increase their tax refund. Because the coefficient on Constraint captures the relationship between financial constraints and cash ETRs for profitable firms, these patterns suggest a negative coefficient on Constraint.
Next we consider loss firms. When a firm reports negative pretax book income and positive cash taxes (i.e., CashETR<0 and Loss=1), we expect a positive coefficient on the Loss*Constraint interaction. This result would indicate that these constrained firms take actions to reduce their positive tax liability. When a firm reports negative pretax book income and negative cash taxes (i.e., CashETR>0 and Loss=1), we expect a positive coefficient on the Loss*Constraint interaction. This result would suggest that these constrained firms try to forward cannot lower their current period cash taxes as they are already zero and cannot increase their cash refunds because they cannot carry back. Thus we continue to exclude these firms.
increase their refund. These predictions imply an expected positive coefficient on the Loss*Constraint term and on the sum of the coefficients on Constraint and Loss*Constraint (as the sum represents the overall constraint coefficient estimate for the loss firms). The following figure summarizes the predicted coefficients on Constraint and the Loss*Constraint interaction.
Expected Coefficient on Constraint when CashETR is the Dependent Variable
Positive cash taxes Negative cash taxes (refund)
Positive pretax book income CashETR>0 and Loss=0
NEGATIVE coefficient (constrained firm reduces cash taxes paid)
CashETR<0 and Loss=0
NEGATIVE coefficient (constrained firm increases cash refund)
Negative pretax book income CashETR<0 and Loss=1
POSITIVE coefficient (constrained firm reduces cash taxes paid)
CashETR>0 and Loss=1
POSITIVE coefficient (constrained firm increases cash refund)
Panel A of Table 5 These results are generally consistent with our expectations and suggest that financiallyconstrained firms with pretax profits or losses increase tax avoidance to generate additional cash flows by reducing tax payments or increasing refunds. 
Alternative Measures of Tax Planning
In this subsection we examine the impact of financial constraints on tax planning using two alternative measures of tax avoidance, CurrentETR and FederalETR. CurrentETR is defined as the ratio of current tax expense to pretax income adjusted for special items [txc / (pi -spi)]
and FederalETR is defined as the ratio of current federal income taxes to domestic pretax income (txfed/pidom). 25 Although CashETR is a more direct measure of our construct of interest, cash savings through tax planning, there is a potential timing mismatch between the numerator and denominator (i.e., cash payments for taxes may not occur within the same fiscal period as the income to which they relate). The potential mismatch can result in payments or refunds from adjacent years being included in our year of interest, a concern that is heightened for constrained firms if these firms delay tax payments to future years. 26 By using the accounting accrual (both 24 In untabulated robustness tests, we repeat this analysis including only loss firms to ensure that the substantial portion of the sample with positive pretax income is not driving the result. The results are consistent with those reported in the tables. 25 As with CashETR, for both CurrentETR and FederalETR, if a firm's ETR is above one (below negative one), the measure is set equal to one (negative one). 26 A related concern to the timing mismatch is that, in addition to direct changes in tax avoidance, firms could attempt to reduce their estimated payments in order to save cash. Although this would be a very short term savings and is not the primary mechanism we hypothesize, it would reduce the cash ETR and increase net cash flows in current tax expense and federal tax expense) we are able to ensure that our results are not driven by attempts to generate short term savings by manipulating the amount and timing of estimated tax payments (although even this strategy could be viewed as a tax avoidance strategy to reduce short term cash outflows). Further, CashETR is a more direct proxy for a firm's worldwide cash tax burden but FederalETR is the best proxy available for a firm's U.S. cash tax burden. As such,
FederalETR can provide more direct evidence regarding domestic tax revenues.
Panel A of Table 6 presents the results using CurrentETR and FederalETR to proxy for tax planning. For brevity, the coefficients on control variables are not reported. For both tax planning proxies the coefficients on all constraint measures are negative and significant, consistent with our main findings (p-values of < 0.0001). These results confirm that our earlier results are not due to timing mismatches between the recognition of pretax book income and the payment of cash taxes (CurrentETR) and provide additional evidence that tax planning during times of financial constraint reduces U.S. tax revenues (FederalETR). 
Permanent tax savings vs. tax deferral
To better understand the types of tax planning strategies that managers employ to reduce cash taxes when facing financial constraints, we decompose tax savings into two components: tax savings resulting from permanent planning strategies and tax savings from deferral-based planning strategies. Although both permanent and deferral-based strategies produce cash tax savings, permanent strategies are potentially more beneficial than deferral strategies because they difficult financial times. Another possible limitation of our measure relates to tax refunds. Refunds could be associated with our financial constraint variables if firms make estimated tax payments based on expected higher taxable income and then, following an unexpected macroeconomic or firm-level shock, report lower taxable income and owe less tax. Robustness test using the current tax expense and federal tax expense, both accrual numbers, mitigate this concern. Further mitigating this concern, we find no consistent correlation between financial constraints and either taxes payable or the presence of a refund (untabulated). 28 Some caution should be used when interpreting the revenue effect of the constraint coefficients in the FederalETR regressions because FederalETR is an accrual number and does not capture cash flows directly.
(1) result in higher earnings for financial reporting purposes (via a reduction in total tax expense) and (2) produce, dollar for dollar, larger cash savings in present value terms because they do not reverse in future years (unlike deferral-based strategies). Recent research (see the prior discussion of Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker 2012 and Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff 2012) provides evidence suggesting that managers on average focus primarily on tax planning strategies that reduce both cash taxes and financial statement income tax expense (i.e., permanent strategies) with only a secondary interest in tax planning strategies that only produce a cash flow benefit (i.e., deferral strategies).
In our setting, we anticipate that managers of financially constrained firms likely still have a preference for permanent tax planning strategies because financially constrained firms have incentives to increase both cash flows and reported earnings. However, because financially constrained firms have a greatly increased need for cash relative to unconstrained firms and firms likely have untapped deferral-based tax planning opportunities, we anticipate that they are also more likely to engage in deferral-based strategies despite the lack of a financial reporting benefit.
To examine whether any reduction in a firm's cash ETR is the result of permanent versus temporary tax planning strategies, Panel B of Table 6 presents the results using Permanent and Deferral to proxy for tax planning. For brevity, the coefficients on control variables are not reported. 31 For both tax planning proxies the coefficients on all constraint measures are negative and significant, consistent with our main findings (p-values of < 0.0001 with the exception of the regression of Permanent on Tightening which produces a p-value of 0.0939). These results suggest that firms use a broad range of tax strategies to reduce cash taxes when faced with financial constraints.
To examine the relative importance of tax planning strategies that result in permanent tax savings versus deferral-based tax planning strategies, we use seemingly unrelated regression analysis (untabulated) to compare the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients on the various financial constraints measures when Permanent is the dependent variable to the analogous coefficients on the various financial constraint measures when Deferral is the dependent variable. Focusing first on the macroeconomic measures of financial constraints, we observe mixed evidence. The coefficient on GDP% is significantly more negative when the dependent variable is Permanent, suggesting a greater increase in permanent tax strategies relative to deferral tax strategies. The coefficient on Tightening is significantly more negative when
Deferral is the dependent variable, suggesting a greater increase in deferral tax strategies relative to permanent tax strategies. Focusing next on the firm-level measures of financial constraints, the coefficients on RankZ and RankWW are significantly more negative when the dependent variable is Permanent providing some evidence that managers facing firm-specific financial constraints 31 The coefficients on the control variables are generally consistent with prior research although the signs on some control variables vary depending on the tax planning proxy implemented.
focus more on tax planning strategies that result in permanent tax savings.
Overall, it appears that for macroeconomic induced financial constraints, managers implement tax planning strategies that achieve savings via both permanent and deferral tax strategies without a strong propensity to implement one method over the other. For firm-level induced financial constraints, managers achieve tax savings through both deferral and permanent tax planning strategies but implement permanent tax saving strategies to a greater extent. Given that financially constrained firms have incentives to increase cash flows as well as earnings for financial reporting purposes, it is not entirely surprising that more often than not the evidence suggests that firms attempt to increase tax avoidance via permanent tax planning strategies. In light of prior research suggesting that managers generally favor tax avoidance strategies that increase cash flows and lower ETRs (permanent strategies), the general increase in tax savings via deferral strategies is nevertheless interesting.
Additional Sensitivity Analyses
In this section we discuss a series of sensitivity tests (untabulated). Our first sensitivity test examines the role that foreign operations play in our overall results. Multinational firms (MNCs) face a potentially different set of tradeoffs when making decisions regarding financial constraints and tax planning. MNCs can face constraints in the U.S., abroad, or globally (i.e., both in the U.S. and abroad). A MNC's response to financial constraint will vary depending on the source of the constraint. For example, a U.S. MNC could relieve a financial constraint at the U.S. parent level by repatriating foreign profits held abroad. The repatriation would likely trigger U.S. taxation on the foreign earnings (taxed at 35% less any available foreign tax credit) but would result in a net inflow of cash to the U.S. parent. This type of behavior biases against us finding a negative association between financial constraints and CashETR because repatriations can result in an increase in cash taxes paid but not affect worldwide income, thereby increasing the firm's CashETR. Alternatively, it is possible that large MNCs are better able to increase their tax avoidance behavior during periods of financial constraint through activities such as income shifting. This behavior could result in drastically different outcomes depending upon the location of the constraint. For U.S. firms constrained domestically, there is an incentive to shift income into the U.S. from foreign locations. This could result in an increase in U.S. taxes paid (and likely total taxes paid given the high statutory U.S. rate) but would alleviate the constraint. In contrast, a firm facing financial constraints abroad could attempt to shift income out of the U.S.
into foreign locations resulting in a reduction in U.S. taxation but potentially an increase in foreign taxes (and an uncertain impact on worldwide taxes). Due to data limitations it is difficult to measure financial constraints and cash taxes at a country level. To ensure that our earlier results are not solely driven by multinational firms, we perform several additional tests. First, because our macroeconomic measures capture the economic conditions in the U.S., and our firm specific measures capture worldwide constraints that are likely driven by constraints at the U.S.
parent company, we attempt to capture tax planning in the U.S. using the FederalETR measure described in Section 6.4. As previously noted, results using FederalETR are consistent with our hypotheses. Second, we repeat our analysis on a subsample of our firms that do not report any foreign pretax income and, as a result, do not suffer from potential jurisdictional mismatching of financial constraints and tax planning proxies. Inferences from the results using this sample of domestic firms are largely unchanged from the main analysis. 32 32 One particular complication related to multinationals is the choice to designate foreign earnings as permanently reinvested (PRE). When a firm designates foreign earnings as PRE, the firm does not need to record the associated deferred tax expense related to repatriating those earnings. This designation would increase our Deferral measure without actually reducing current period tax payments. In our supplemental analysis of firms that do not report any foreign pretax income, we continue to observe a negative and significant coefficient on all four measures of
We also examine the relation between cash tax avoidance and financial constraints using a changes analysis. The changes analysis controls for any correlated omitted variables that are stationary through time. In this analysis, we use the annual change in CashETR as our dependent variable and include changes (rather than levels) of our control variables. For the constraint measures we use the change in the firm specific measures, RankZ and RankWW, as our test variables but continue to use the macroeconomic measures, GDP% and Tightening, as previously defined since these are already measured in changes (i.e., the annual percentage change in GDP and the change in lending standards). Consistent with our hypotheses, we continue to observe significant negative coefficients on the constraint measures using this specification.
We also perform a sensitivity test that examines the relation between cash tax avoidance and both macroeconomic and firm-specific financial constraints simultaneously. To do this, we include both a macroeconomic constraint measure and a firm-specific constraint measure in our regression model concurrently. We find significant negative coefficients on both measures indicating that firms' cash tax avoidance behavior is incrementally related to both firm specific and economy wide financial constraints.
Our next two sensitivity tests focus on when financial constraints are measured. Because it is possible that tax planning strategies undertaken by financially constrained firms take longer than a year to implement, we first repeat our analysis using the two year lag of our constraint measures (i.e., we measure Constraint in year t-2) and observe results that are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in the main analysis.
In our second timing sensitivity test, we measure Constraint in year t. Our original research design, which measures Constraint in year t-1, implicitly assumes that managers do not constraint when Deferral is the dependent variable. This gives comfort that the PRE designation is not driving our main Deferral results.
anticipate that their firms will become financially constrained. The insider trading literature, however, provides evidence that managers do understand how profitable their firms will be for several years into the future (see, for example, Piotroski and Roulstone 2004) . If managers are able to anticipate impending financial constraints, they will likely take actions to increase cash flows in the periods of financial constraint. This foresight by managers is more likely to apply to firm-specific financial constraints than macroeconomic constraints (as that would require foresight into macroeconomic cycles which, as the financial crisis indicates, is difficult). We repeat our analysis using both firm-specific constraints and CashETR in year t and observe significant negative coefficients on our firm-specific measures of financial constraint. These results are consistent with managerial foresight for firm-specific financial constraints. When we repeat our analysis using both macroeconomic constraints and CashETR in year t, we observe significant negative coefficients on only one of the two macroeconomic measures. These results support the notion that managers have greater foresight for future firm conditions but less foresight for macroeconomic conditions.
An additional potential concern with our research design is that our observed findings, particularly in the case of the macroeconomic tests, are the result of government tax relief during times of economic hardship. The most prominent example of such relief during our sample period is the bonus depreciation provisions that were implemented during the 2000s. 33 To control for this possibility we create an indicator variable Bonus equal to one for years with bonus depreciation and zero otherwise. We then interact Bonus with capital expenditures (as bonus depreciation only applies to firms that make new capital expenditures during those time 33 The U.S. Government instituted bonus depreciation tax relief through various legislation covering assets purchased from September 10, 2001 through December 31, 2004 and January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2010. periods The discussion and calculations above are based on the regression estimates obtained from our tests. As a simple check on the reasonableness of our estimate, we obtain an alternative estimate of the effect of tax planning using the raw SOI data from the IRS. From 2008 to 2009, the tax base -total income subject to tax -for all profitable C-corporations fell at a rate of 10% from $910 billion to $816 billion, a $94 billion decrease. At the same time total income tax after credits fell at an even faster rate of 12% from $207 billion to $182 billion. The change in the tax base of $94 billion is likely primarily due to the deterioration of macroeconomic conditions during the financial crisis and, possibly to a lesser extent, due to an increase in tax planning by firms. We calculate an effective tax rate using the SOI data by dividing "Total income tax after we control for a number of other factors that could also impact the tax planning activities of firms but the estimate we obtain from our regression models, 3%, is comparable to the unadjusted rate reduction of 1% observed in the IRS data.
Conclusion
The extant academic literature examining the determinants of firms' tax planning activities focus almost exclusively on firm-level characteristics (for a review of the literature see Shackelford and Shevlin 2001 and Heitzman 2010) and more recently on the impact of specific executives (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2010; Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker 2012) . In this study, we extend this literature and are one of the first to investigate whether macroeconomic factors also affect firm-level tax avoidance behavior. The factor of interest in this study, financial constraints, can impact a firm as a result of its own circumstances or as a result of macroeconomic conditions.
In this study, we take a broad view of financial constraint and define a firm as more financially constrained if it experiences an increase in the cost of external financing or an increase in the difficulty of accessing external funds. The financing need and the resulting constraint can arise from a variety of sources. We focus on two major sources of the financing need: investment opportunities and financial distress. Firms with unfunded investment opportunities require additional cash in order to finance those additional investments. Firms in financial distress require additional cash in order to finance existing operations and remain solvent. For both of these sources of financing need, the financially constrained firm needs additional financing through the least costly source available. As such, financially constrained firms are likely to search for new sources of internal funds. In this study, we investigate the association between financial constraints, at both the macroeconomic and firm-specific level, and a significant source of internal funds available to firms -cash tax savings, or more generally tax avoidance.
We document results consistent with our predictions, firms facing either macroeconomic financial constraints or firm-specific financial constraints exhibit lower near-term cash ETRs.
The reduction in cash ETR is also economically significant. In addition to documenting an association between both macroeconomic and firm-level financial constraints and near-term cash ETRs, we examine whether the decrease in cash ETRs is the result of permanent and/or deferral-based tax planning strategies. We find firms increase the level of tax planning via both permanent and deferral-based strategies following periods of financial constraint. Several recent studies have documented evidence consistent with managers focusing on tax avoidance behavior that first and foremost reduces the tax expense accrued on the financial statements with less concern on the actual cash flow savings (or deferral) generated by the tax strategies (e.g., Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and Shroff 2012) . Our study provides evidence that there are some instances that increase managers' focus on cash tax savings regardless of the potential financial reporting benefits.
The findings of this study are potentially of interest for several reasons. First, we contribute to the growing literature on the determinants of firms' tax avoidance behavior.
Second, this study also contributes to the broad literature on financial constraints. Third, this study informs the debate related to the relative importance of tax planning activities generating cash flow savings versus financial reporting benefits. Finally, given the record high level of the federal deficit and current economic conditions, it is important to understand the interplay between macroeconomic forces and firm-level tax avoidance behavior as legislators look for ways to reduce the federal deficit. Table 3 Correlation 
